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Abstract 
 
Cylindrical fuel casks often have impact limiters surrounding just the ends of the cask 
shaft in a typical “dumbbell” arrangement.  The primary purpose of these impact limiters 
is to absorb energy to reduce loads on the cask structure during impacts associated with a 
severe accident.  Impact limiters are also credited in many packages with protecting 
closure seals and maintaining lower peak temperatures during fire events.  For this credit 
to be taken in safety analyses, the impact limiter attachment system must be shown to 
retain the impact limiter following Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and 
Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) impacts.  Large casks are often certified by 
analysis only because of the costs associated with testing.  Therefore, some cask impact 
limiter attachment systems have not been tested in real impacts.  A recent structural 
analysis of the T-3 Spent Fuel Containment Cask found problems with the design of the 
impact limiter attachment system. Assumptions in the original Safety Analysis for 
Packaging (SARP) concerning the loading in the attachment bolts were found to be 
inaccurate in certain drop orientations.  This paper documents the lessons learned and 
their applicability to impact limiter attachment system designs.  
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Introduction 
 
Impact Limiters are used to absorb energy from the impacts associated with 
transportation accidents.  The fuel casks they typically protect are designed for structural 
strength rather than energy absorption.  As safety analysis for packaging has developed 
over the years, the secondary function of these impact limiters in thermal protection of 
cask components has become more prominent.  The thermal protection provided by the 
impact limiters in the regulatory fire scenario can include preventing over-temperature of 
elastomer seals as well as preventing melting and/or phase changes of cask components 
and maintaining structural materials at temperatures required for strength rating.  
 
Early designs of impact limiter attachment systems often involved simple attachments on 
the cask shaft away from potential impact points.  The implicit assumption seems to have 
been that the impact limiter would compress around the end of the cask in an impact and 
any attachment along the cask shaft would be in a low stress region not subject to 
significant loading. A review of Cask SARPs  also shows an emphasis on demonstrating 
retention of the impact during the puncture pin test rather than the nine meter drop.  
Because of these assumptions, the impact limiter attachment points in many packages 
were shown to retain the impact limiter in place for the nine meter drop only by a simple, 
cursory analysis.   
 
The Model T-3 Cask is a Type B spent fuel cask designed in the late seventies for 
transport of Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) fuel.   Neither full scale nor partial scale 
impact testing was performed in the original certification process.   The analytical tools 
available at the time were limited, but the cask was certified with the assumption that the 
impact limiters would remain in place to protect the cask in the regulatory fire event.   
 
In 2007, an addendum was prepared to allow the transport of sodium bonded fuel in the 
T-3 cask.  The Addendum1 required an internal containment vessel to ensure no in-
leakage of moderator would contact the fuel.  It also required a re-evaluation of the cask 
to the dynamic accident sequence using modern detailed modeling with the latest 
ABAQUS explicit code.  Although, no testing was conducted to support the addendum, 
concerns by the regulatory reviewer led to the a detailed analysis of the impact limiter 
attachment system in all orientations which could challenge it.  The results called into 
question the original assumption in the Safety Analysis with regard to impact limiter 
retention. 
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T-3 Cask  
 
The Model T-3 Cask is a Type B package designed specifically to contain, shield and 
ensure sub criticality of irradiated fuel pins and assemblies from the Fast Flux Test 
Facility (FFTF) for transportation over public highways.P2 P  The major design features of 
the T-3 Cask, shown in Figure 1, include two cylindrical and concentric stainless steel 
shells separated by 7¾ inches of lead gamma-shielding material.   The inner shell is a 
length of 8-inch Schedule 40 pipe with a full diameter opening on one end for loading 
and unloading contents and a smaller diameter opening on the opposing end for use with 
a push rod for removing warped or expanded contents from the cask cavity.  The full 
diameter cask containment vessel opening is closed with shield plug sealed by viton 
elastomer O-rings.  The push rod plug on the opposing end of the cask containment is 
also sealed by viton O-rings. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
T-3 Cask 
 
The outer shell of the T-3 cask is composed of 1-inch thick stainless steel with an outer 
fire shield made up of 0.080 inch diameter wire spiral wound on the outside surface of 
the cask capped with 10 gage stainless steel sheet.  The shield plug end of the cask has a 
closure plate (labeled as the top head in Figure 1) which provides protection for the cask 
closure.  A smaller cover plate protects the push rod plug on the opposing end of the 
package.   
The impact limiters shown in Figure 2 consist of low-carbon steel shells filled with rigid 
polyurethane foam each mounted via four ⅝-inch bolts equally spaced around the 
circumference of the cask. The cross-section of an impact limiter is depicted in Figure 2 
which shows two of the four attachment bolts.  Each bolt is about four inches long and 
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passes through an unthreaded lug on the cask body.  The end of the bolt threads into an 
insert in the impact limiter that is attached to steel channel embedded in the polyurethane 
and runs parallel to the shaft of the cask as shown in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Impact Limiter Detail 
 
 
The finite element model shown in Figure 3 is an advanced dynamic model depicting the 
cask in a steep angle drop just before impacting from a 30 foot drop in the vertical 
direction.  Impact limiter components are fully modeled in a detailed mesh as are the 
bolts and lugs.  Each component was modeled in ABAQUS with elements consisting of 
three dimensional Type S4R shell elements and Type C3D8R brick elements. The model 
accounts for non-uniformity in the impact limiter foam stress, the constraining effects of 
the impact limiter skins, loads on contact surfaces between components and energy 
absorbed through plastic deformation of components. The cask itself is composed of rigid 
elements since this model specifically evaluates the impact limiters and the attachment 
system. 
 
The output of the steep angle drop analysis indicated some unexpected results which 
were not documented in the T-3 existing Safety Basis.  The existing Safety Basis 
considered that the only significant impact limiter bolt loads in a steep drop (CGOC) 
would be axial loads from the moment applied to an impact limiter by an assumed 
linearly increasing crush force across the impact limiter face.(Figure 4).  The detailed 
finite element analysis revealed that the shear load on the bolts is much more significant 
than any tensile force applied.  
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Figure 3 
Finite Element Model 
 
Figure 5 shows the results of the detailed finite element analysis. As the cask impacts in a 
steep angle drop, the shaft of the cask rotates slightly more than the impact limiter 
pocket.  This creates displacements between the bolt attachment point and the lugs which 
creates large shear strains in the short bolts.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Original Analysis of Impact Limiter  
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Figure 5 
Results of Steep Angle Drop 
 
Figure 6 is a close up of the far left bolt showing the shear load placed on it by the 
relative displacement between the cask shaft and the impact limiter insert.  The impact 
limiter insert is well reinforced by the steel channel which is both embedded in the 
polyurethane foam and welded to the skin of the impact limiter pocket.  The lug welded 
to the cask body is also a relatively stiff component and the gap between the insert and 
lug is less than an inch when the impact limiter is secured in place.  The attachment bolts 
are therefore in a highly constrained condition that makes them susceptible to high 
strains. 
 
 
Figure 6  
Deformation of Bolt Opposing Initial Impact Point 
 
The other three impact limiter attachment bolts also reached the failure strain of the 
bolting material.  Figure 7 is a close up of the far right bolt which has the lowest strain of 
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the four attachment bolts in this scenario but was still considered to be failed.  The same 
analysis was repeated for a NCT drop of one foot.  The results demonstrated that the 
attachment system would retain the impact limiter in place for the start of the HAC 
impact scenario.  
            
 
 
Figure 7  
Deformation of Bolt Nearest Initial Impact 
 
These analysis results called into question the assumption that the impact limiters would 
be in place for a post HAC  impact fire event.  The SARP Addendum for shipment of the 
sodium bonded fuel addressed this issue by analyzing the cask without the impact 
limiters in place for the fire event.  O-ring seals and other component temperatures for 
both the cask and 6CVL were found to be acceptable in the fire event without the 
protection of the impact limiters. 
 
Design Improvements 
 
Two U.S. Certified Casks which made changes to the impact limiter attachments during 
development included the Nuclear Assurance Corporation Legal Weight Truck (LWT) 
Cask3 and the U.S. Department of Energy Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
Transportation System (RTG)4.   
 
The LWT uses a clevis pin arrangement with the center lug embedded in the impact 
limiter and the surrounding lugs attached to the cask surface.  Although different than the 
T-3 design, this has the same potential for highly constrained attachment components 
vulnerable to failure by what might otherwise be considered relatively small relative 
displacements between the cask and the impact limiter.  The thickness of the lug material 
was increased to address test failures.  The RTG Package design was modified at least in 
part to ensure concerns with constrained attachment bolts were addressed. 
 
One cask design where attachment point constraint is addressed is the Hanford 
Unirradiated Fuel Package (HUFP) design whose impact limiter is shown in Figure 8P5P.  
Although this design has a similar layout as the T-3 cask with four bolts passing through 
lugs on the shaft of the cask, there are several key difference.  The first notable difference 
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is that the length of the bolts extends the full depth of the impact limiter pocket.  Also, the 
bolt pockets in the impact limiter are large enough to allow for significant bending in 
each bolt before concentrated shear loads are imposed on the bolts.  Relative 
displacements between the cask body and impact limiter on the order of those seen in the 
T-3 Cask, lead to much smaller bolt strains in this design as validated by testing and 
anaylsis3. 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8  
HUFP Impact Limiter Detail 
 
Conclusions 
 
Many older casks have impact limiter attachment systems which may fail in certain drop 
test orientations required by 10CFR 71.73.  Care should be taken to ensure that the 
assumptions in Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARPs) are correct.  New cask 
designs should consider attachment bolt or pin loading conditions carefully when impact 
limiters are credited with remaining in place in the post impact regulatory fire.  
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